






















































































































































How do countries hold their financial wealth? Our objective is to provide a
description of country portfolios and advance a parsimonious explanation of their
main features. By country portfolio, we refer to the financial wealth of the country and
how it is distributed across holdings of domestic capital and various foreign assets. By
the net foreign assets of a country, we refer to the country’s holdings of foreign equity
and loans minus foreigners’ holdings of domestic equity and loans. We first turn to the
data and ask: How large are net foreign asset positions? What country characteristics
seem to be associated with positive net foreign asset positions? How persistent are
net foreign asset positions? What is the relative importance of foreign loans and
equity? With the answers at hand, we go to the theory and ask: Why?
To determine the main features of country portfolios, we construct a new
database on foreigners’ holdings of domestic equity and loans, and domestic
residents’ holdings of foreign equity and loans. Our sample covers the period 1966-
1997 and includes 68 countries that account for over 90 percent of world production
and trade. Constructing this database forces us to choose among fragmentary and
imperfect sources of information and then make (heroic?) assumptions on how to
reconcile them and fill in the gaps.
1 Despite this, we feel confident the inferences we
draw from this data are robust. In fact, there is nothing subtle about the empirical
regularities we highlight here. The following are all very striking features of the data:
1.  Net foreign asset positions as a share of wealth are small in absolute value and
negative for most countries. Roughly 80 percent of the observations in our sample
consist of countries whose net foreign assets as a share of wealth are less than
20 percent in absolute value. We also find that the net foreign asset position is
negative for about 80 percent of the observations in our sample.
                                               
1 See Sinn [1990], Rider [1994] and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [1999] for alternative sources of
data on foreign asset positions.2
2.  There is a strong positive relationship between financial wealth and the net
foreign asset position in a cross-section of countries. In particular, we find that
when financial wealth doubles, the share of net foreign assets in wealth increases
by three to six percentage points. Cross-country variation in financial wealth
seems to explain (in a statistical sense) most of the variation in net foreign asset
positions, even after controlling for a set of variables that are designed to capture
cross-country differences in aggregate production functions.
3.  The share of net foreign assets in wealth is very persistent over time. A simple
regression of this share on its lagged value delivers a slope coefficient of 0.98 and
a R
2 of 93 percent. Since we find that between 40 percent and 70 percent of the
variation in changes in net foreign assets can be attributed to changes in relative
wealth, it seems reasonable to conclude that persistence in relative wealth is an
important source of persistence in foreign assets.
4.  Gross foreign asset positions are small and consist mostly of foreign loans rather
than foreign equity.  In developing countries, foreign equity assets and liabilities
are roughly 0.3 and 2.8 percent of wealth, while foreign loan assets and liabilities
account for 4.5 percent and 8.8 percent of wealth. In industrial countries, foreign
equity assets and liabilities are roughly 3.3 and 3.9 percent of wealth, while
foreign loan assets and liabilities account for 11 percent of wealth each.
To sum up, we observe that net foreign asset positions are small relative to
wealth and tend to be negative, except for a few rich countries. These net foreign
asset positions are remarkably persistent as a fraction of wealth, and mostly consist
of foreign loans rather than foreign equity holdings. This picture that emerges from
the data is so clear that we think it should constitute the main target of any successful
theory of international capital flows.
It seems safe to argue that such a theory requires at least two ingredients. To
explain the strong positive association between wealth and net foreign asset
positions, the theory must contain at least one force that creates incentives for capital3
to move from rich to poor countries. Natural candidates for this role are diminishing
returns at the country level and country-specific production risk. If either of these two
forces are present, the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital declines as more capital
is invested in a country, creating an incentive to invest in countries that have little
capital. In the absence of a countervailing force, this incentive would only be
eliminated if capital stocks were equalized across countries.
Hence the theory needs a second ingredient to explain why net foreign asset
positions are so small.
2 A popular view is that the theory just needs to recognize that
rich countries have better aggregate production functions, and this is why investors
keep most of their capital in rich countries even in the presence of diminishing returns
and production risk. While this is likely to be true to some extent, we look elsewhere
for the second ingredient of the theory, for three reasons.  First, we find that standard
variables we think are associated with better aggregate production functions (human
capital, quality of institutions, and others) seem to be either unrelated to the net
foreign asset position of a country or, alternatively, explain very little of its variation
(See Table 3 and the discussion of it below). Second, while better aggregate
production functions in rich countries can explain why net foreign asset positions are
small, they cannot explain why gross foreign equity positions are also small. To the
extent that investors have a desire to diversify production risk, the theory would
predict that they choose large gross foreign equity positions that are roughly
balanced. Finally, better aggregate production functions in rich countries cannot
explain why most international trade consists of loans rather than equity. While both
assets are useful to transfer capital across countries, equity has the additional benefit
of allowing countries to share production risk and should therefore always be
preferred over loans. Why are observed foreign equity positions so small? Why are
foreign loans rather than foreign equity the asset that is most traded internationally?
To answer these questions, we would still need to add additional elements to the
theory anyway.
                                               
2 See Lucas [1990] for a review of alternative possibilities.4
In this paper we explore the alternative hypothesis that sovereign risk might
be the second ingredient that the theory needs.
3 In the presence of this sort of risk,
domestic capital offers domestic investors not only the value of its production flow, but
also a hedge against the risk of foreign default. This creates a home bias in the
demand for capital that might explain why net foreign asset positions are small.
Should we also expect that sovereign risk leads to small gross foreign equity
positions? Is it even possible that sovereign risk explains why most international trade
in assets consists of loans rather than equity? The answers to these questions
depend crucially on the consequences for investors of a foreign default.
Assume first that if a country defaults on its foreign obligations, foreign
countries respond by seizing the assets that this country owns abroad and then using
these assets to (partially) compensate creditors. Assume also that the process by
which assets are seized and transferred to creditors does not give rise to any costs or
loss of value. In this case, the loss suffered by creditors in the event of default is
determined by their net foreign asset position vis-à-vis the defaulting country. To
minimize exposure to sovereign risk, investors then choose small net foreign asset
positions. But they do not have to hold small gross foreign equity positions. In fact, to
the extent that investors have a desire to diversify production risk they would again
choose large foreign equity positions that are roughly balanced. Under these
assumptions, sovereign risk provides a rationale for why net foreign asset positions
are small, but it cannot explain why gross foreign equity positions are small. Neither
can it explain why most international trade consists of loans rather than equity.
If we want to hold sovereign risk responsible for the small gross foreign equity
positions observed in the data, we need to remove at least one of the assumptions of
the previous paragraph. Perhaps legal systems do not allow creditors to seize the
foreign assets of defaulting countries. Or, even if they do, the transfer of ownership
                                               
3 Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996, p.349] define sovereign risk as referring to “... any situation in
which a government defaults on loan contracts with foreigners, seizes foreign assets located
within its borders, or prevents domestic residents from fully meeting obligations to foreign
creditors.” This is a good description of what we have in mind.5
might involve large costs and a substantial loss of value.  In this case, investors’
exposure to sovereign risk is no longer their net foreign asset position vis-à-vis the
defaulting country, but instead some fraction of their gross foreign asset position.
Now the existence of sovereign risk can potentially explain why investors choose
small gross foreign equity positions.
With the help of the additional (and we think realistic) assumption that
transferring ownership of equity is costlier than transferring ownership of loans,
sovereign risk can also explain why most international trade in assets consists of
foreign loans rather than foreign equity. Investors issuing foreign loans and equity are
willing to sell these assets at a discount that reflects the value for them of the gain
they receive in the event of default.
4  What is this gain? A domestic investor who has
borrowed abroad receives the full value of the loans. This gain is exactly equal to the
loss experienced by the foreign investor. A domestic investor who has sold equity
claims to foreigners receives the full value of the equity, but loses any valuable
advantage that foreign investors brought to the firm (experience, managerial skills,
know-how, access to better technology or relationships, firm-specific knowledge, and
so on). This gain is less than the loss experienced by the foreign investor. Therefore
in the event of default, foreign loans give rise only to pure transfers while foreign
equity creates losses. While the latter allows investors to hedge against production
risk, it is a worse hedge against sovereign risk than the former. If the desire to avoid
diminishing returns induces investors to transfer capital from rich to poor countries,
foreign loans will be a more attractive asset if sovereign risk is high relative to
production risk. Thus, sovereign risk has also the potential to explain why loans are
the preferred asset to finance capital flows.
The notion that foreign equity and loans are subject to sovereign risk is hardly
novel or controversial among observers of international financial markets. The
interesting issue is whether reasonable probabilities of default can quantitatively
                                               
4 This discount in loan contracts shows up in the interest rate. The evidence is overwhelming
that loans to developing countries usually command a higher interest rate than domestic
loans. It is much less clear whether we could find any comparable discount on equity.6
explain the main features of country portfolios. To determine this, we construct a
simple North-South model of international capital flows. The production technology
exhibits diminishing returns at the country level and country-specific risk. In this
model, the world economy experiences periods with substantial international trade in
assets, which end up in a crisis period in which South defaults on its foreign
obligations. North investors seize South’s foreign assets, but this transfer of assets is
costly. The default initiates a crisis period in which international financial markets shut
down. Eventually, international trade in assets resumes and the cycle starts again.
It seems clear that this model can, in principle, explain the facts discussed
above. If sovereign risk is sufficiently high, net capital flows will be small (Fact 1). If
either diminishing returns or country-specific production risk is important, we should
observe a tendency for capital to flow from rich to poor countries (Fact 2). To the
extent that transferring ownership of foreign equity is costlier than transferring
ownership of loans, gross foreign asset positions should be small and consist
primarily of loans rather than equity (Fact 4). If the model generates persistence in the
world distribution of wealth, this can naturally explain the persistence of foreign asset
positions (Fact 3). It is much less clear however whether this model is able to provide
a reasonable quantitative description of the data. A perhaps surprising finding is that,
even in the presence of reasonable diminishing returns and production risk, the
probability that international crises occur twice a century is enough to generate a set
of country portfolios that are roughly consistent with the data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I provides a brief description of our
database and extensively documents the four facts mentioned above. Section II
presents the model and discusses its main qualitative and quantitative implications.
Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of how we constructed our database, while
Appendix B contains some proofs.7
I. A Description of Country Portfolios
In this section, we describe the main characteristics of country portfolios using
a new database covering 68 countries from 1966 to 1997. We first provide an
overview of the sources and methodology used to construct the data. We then
summarize its main features in the form of four facts. Appendix A provides details on
the data and describes how we account for changes in the value of stocks of assets.
I.1  A New Database on Country Portfolios
Our database contains estimates of domestic capital stocks and foreign
assets of countries.
 5 In particular, we have measures for the following quantities:
k = Domestic capital stock
e = Domestic equity owned by foreign residents.
e* = Foreign equity owned by domestic residents.
l = Loans issued by domestic residents and owned by foreign residents.
l* = Loans issued by foreign residents and owned by domestic residents.
We measure these quantities per domestic resident in constant 1990 US dollars.  We
define a=k+e*-e+l*-l and f=e*-e+l*-l as the  financial wealth or portfolio of the country
and its net foreign assets, respectively.
  We refer to a country as a creditor (debtor) if
its net foreign assets are positive (negative).
We construct estimates of each component of financial wealth in two steps.
First, we use the limited available information on stocks of these assets to determine
an initial value. Second, we use flow data and estimates of changes in the value of
these assets to extend the initial stocks forward and backward over time.  We rely on
                                               
5 We abstract from other components of wealth such as land, natural resources, and human
capital.8
this method of cumulating flows even for those countries where more stock data is
available in order to avoid a potential bias. Since long time series of stock data are
available only for a few rich countries, using these as the primary source would
essentially result in different methods being used to construct stocks for rich and poor
countries. These differences would then contaminate our inferences regarding how
portfolios vary with wealth.
We rely on data from a number of standard sources.  We obtain initial stocks
of domestic capital from the Penn World Tables, and use flow data on gross domestic
investment to build up stocks of capital valued in US dollars at PPP. In order to
determine foreign holdings of domestic equity and domestic holdings of foreign
equity, we rely primarily on data on stocks and flows of direct and portfolio equity
investment reported in the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments
Statistics Yearbook.  We again use the limited available information on stocks
reported in this and a variety of other sources to determine the initial level of each
asset for each country, and then use corresponding flow data from the balance of
payments to construct stocks for remaining years.  Finally, we combine stock data on
the debts of developing countries reported in the World Bank’s Global Development
Finance with data on stocks and flows on debt from the Balance of Payments
Statistics Yearbook to build up stocks of borrowing and lending for all countries in our
sample.
6
Our sample of countries is determined primarily by data availability.  We begin
with a sample of 98 countries with population greater than one million and per capita
GDP greater than 1000 US dollars at PPP in 1990.  Of these we discard 25 countries
with missing, incomplete, or inconsistent balance of payments data. This leaves us
with an unbalanced panel of 73 countries spanning on average 25 of the years
between 1966 and 1997. In the empirical work that follows we restrict attention to a
                                               
6 We assume throughout that stocks of debt reported in these sources constitute solely the
assets and liabilities of domestic residents. To the extent that these reflect debt issued by or
owed to foreign-owned firms operating in the country, we are overestimating the loan assets
and liabilities of domestic residents. Given that foreign holdings of domestic equity are small
relative to wealth this mismeasurement is unlikely to be empirically important.9
set of 68 countries excluding five transition economies. Table 1 lists these countries
classified by geographical region.  As the table shows, our sample includes basically
all industrial countries and a substantial number of developing countries from all
regions of the world.  The countries in our sample account for over 90 percent of
world production and commodity trade. It is reasonable to think that these countries
also account for a similar fraction of world trade in assets.
 7  Despite this wide
coverage, we do not find that net foreign assets sum to zero across countries in our
sample. In the case of claims on equity, we find that the sum of all countries reported
claims on foreign equity is on average about 3 percent less than reported foreign
claims on domestic equity. In the case of lending the discrepancy is larger, with world
reported borrowing exceeding lending by about 12 percent. While these
discrepancies are not trivial, they are of a comparable order of magnitude to well-
known discrepancies in flows on foreign assets.
I.2  Main Features of Country Portfolios
In this subsection we examine the main features of country portfolios using the
database described above. We organize the discussion around four main facts or
findings.
Fact 1:  Net foreign assets as a share of wealth are small and negative for most
countries.




pooling the available 1717 observations for all countries and years. Overwhelmingly,
net foreign assets represent a small fraction of the wealth of domestic residents.
                                               
7 Our procedure results in estimates of wealth that are very small (and occasionally negative)
for a few country-year observations, corresponding to countries with very large external debt.
We exclude these observations by limiting the sample to those where the ratio of wealth to
GDP is greater than 0.5.10
Roughly 80 percent of the country/year observations are less than 20 percent in
absolute value. Also, about 80 percent of the country-year observations are negative.
Perhaps Figure 1 is concealing important variation across regions and over time in
the size and sign of the net foreign asset position. To rule out this possibility, Table 2
reports the share of net foreign assets in wealth, aggregating across countries in
different  regions and time periods. The top panel reports wealth-weighted averages,
and the lower panel reports the share for the typical (median) country in each group
and period. Clearly, the finding that most countries have a small but negative net
foreign asset position holds across regions and over time.
Since net foreign asset positions are small relative to wealth, it follows that
there is a strong relationship between countries’ financial wealth and their capital
stock. To see this, Figure 2 plots the capital stock, k, against financial wealth, a,
averaging the available years over the period 1966-1997 for each country. A simple
regression of the capital stock on domestic wealth delivers and R
2 of 98 percent and
a slope coefficient of 0.93. Clearly, the world distribution of capital stocks is very close
to the world distribution of wealth. This does not mean however that differences
between these two distributions are random or uninteresting. Although the slope
coefficient appears to be very close to one, the null hypothesis that this coefficient is
one is rejected at conventional significance levels. We also reject the null hypothesis
that the intercept is zero. That is, on average the capital stock exceeds wealth in poor
countries and is less than wealth in rich countries. This leads us to the next fact:
Fact 2:  The share of net foreign assets in the country portfolio increases with wealth
in a cross-section of countries.
The strong positive association between the share of net foreign assets and




, against the logarithm of wealth, ln(a), for each country over 1966-1997.
Virtually all (44 out of 47) developing countries are debtors, as are two-thirds of11
industrial countries (14 out of 21). The ten creditor countries in our sample are mostly
rich industrial countries (Belgium/Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, France, United
Kingdom, Japan, and the Netherlands), and three developing countries (Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, and Lesotho).
8
The relationship between wealth and net foreign asset positions holds across
subperiods. The first row of Table 3 confirms that the simple results in Figure 3
(shown in the first column) hold across the different subperiods (shown in the
remaining columns). The estimated coefficients range from 0.04 to 0.08 and are
significantly different from zero in each subperiod. The magnitudes of these
coefficients indicate that when wealth doubles, the share of foreign assets in wealth
increases by three to six percentage points. In the next row of Table 3 we introduce
regional dummies. With the exception of the first subperiod, the coefficient on the
logarithm of wealth increases slightly, and remains significantly positive. In the third
row of Table 3 we check whether the changes in the wealth elasticity across periods
is an artifact of the changing composition of the sample by restricting attention to a
balanced panel of 8-year average observations. The results do not change
substantially.
There are reasons to think that the relationship between wealth and the net
foreign asset position is even stronger than what a simple regression would find. It is
easy to think of factors that are positively correlated with wealth and are likely to be
negatively correlated with the net foreign asset position of a country. First, wealth is
strongly correlated with human capital, technology and institutional quality, all of
which raise the returns to capital and make foreign assets less attractive for rich
countries. Second, the variability of returns is also negatively correlated with wealth,
making foreign assets less attractive for rich countries. Third, there may also be scale
effects whereby returns are higher in some of the larger, richer economies in our
sample. All of these arguments can be summarized by saying that it is likely that rich
                                               
8 Lesotho is somewhat of an anomaly, as it runs large current account surpluses reflecting
primarily workers’ remittances from South Africa.12
countries have better aggregate production functions and therefore find foreign
assets less attractive. To the extent that this is the case, the simple regressions of the
net foreign asset position on wealth contain omitted variables that bias downwards
the slope coefficient. We therefore introduce a number of additional control variables
into the regression. We proxy for human capital with the number of years of
secondary education in the workforce, and control for scale effects using the
logarithm of population. We include openness to international trade measured as
trade volumes as a share of GDP, financial depth measured as the ratio of M2 to
GDP, government consumption as a share of GDP, and an index of civil liberties, as
proxies for the quality of the institutional environment. We measure the variability of
returns using the standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth over the indicated
period. Finally, we include a set of regional dummies to control for other unobserved
region-specific heterogeneity.
The remainder of Table 3 summarizes the results of this augmented
regression. Averaging over all years, the coefficient on wealth rises to 0.07 and
remains very significant. Consistent with the view that high levels of human capital
make domestic capital more attractive, we find that years of secondary education
enters negatively although not quite significantly at the 10 percent level. Somewhat
surprisingly, population size enters positively, suggesting that there may be
diseconomies of scale or congestion effects that make domestic capital less attractive
in large countries. Public consumption as a share of GDP enters negatively and
approaches significance at the 10 percent level, which may reflect an increased
demand for foreign loans to finance public consumption. Finally, financial depth
enters positively and significantly. This may reflect the fact that countries with well-
developed financial markets have less need for recourse to international financial
markets. The remaining control variables, openness, civil liberties, and the volatility of
growth do not enter significantly. Although the magnitude and significance of the
coefficients on these variables differs somewhat across subperiods, the results are
qualitatively similar to those obtained in the first column.13
From Table 3 we can also obtain a sense of the magnitude and relative
importance of wealth relative to other factors as a determinant of foreign assets
positions. Consider the regression in the first column of Table 3 based on average
data over the period 1966-1997. A one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of
wealth (which corresponds to roughly a three-fold increase) leads to roughly two-
thirds of a standard deviation increase in the net foreign asset position, or about 10
percentage points. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the remaining
significant control variables leads to an increase (in absolute value) of only one-third
of a standard deviation in the the net foreign asset position. Another way to see the
importance of wealth in explaining the cross-country variation in foreign assets is to
perform a variance decomposition of the fitted values from these regressions. The
bottom row of Table 3 reports the share of the variance in predicted foreign assets
that can be attributed to wealth.
 9 Averaging over the entire sample period, we find
that almost 60 percent of the cross-country variation in predicted foreign assets is due
to cross-country variation in wealth. In all but the first subperiod we similarly find that
the majority of the variation in predicted foreign assets is due to variation in wealth.
Fact 3:  The share of net foreign assets in the country portfolio is persistent over time.
Figure 4  plots the share of net foreign assets in wealth in a given country and
year on the vertical axis, against its value lagged one year (in the first panel), five
years (in the second panel) and 10 years (in the third panel) on the horizontal axis,
pooling all country-year observations over the period 1966-1997. From these three
figures it is clear that the share of foreign assets in wealth is very persistent.
10 The
                                               
9 We use a decomposition of the variance of the sum of two correlated random variables
suggested by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare [1997]. In particular, if Z=X+Y, they define the
share of the variance of Z attributable to X as COV(X,Z)/VAR(Z). This number has the
following natural interpretation: If we observe that Z is one percent above its mean but we did
not observe X and Y separately, then we would infer that X is COV(X,Z)/VAR(Z) percent
above its mean value. We apply this defining Z as fitted foreign assets, and X as the estimated
coefficient on wealth multiplied by wealth.
10 This fact was also noted by Kraay and Ventura [Forthcoming] in a smaller sample of 13
OECD economies, who argue that this observation can explain the long-standing puzzle
raised by Feldstein and Horioka [1980].14
simple correlation between the share of foreign assets in country portfolios in a given
year and the same share lagged one year is 0.96. Even over a 10-year horizon the
simple correlation is a respectable 0.55. This very strong persistence of the share of
foreign assets in country portfolios is all the more surprising when one considers how
small foreign assets are relative to wealth. In our sample the typical (median) country
holds roughly –10 percent of its wealth in foreign assets, and its ratio of wealth to
GDP is around 2. This implies that a current account surplus of 5 percent of GDP
sustained for only four years would be sufficient to entirely erase a country’s net
foreign asset position. Yet in the data we see that net foreign assets as a share of
wealth on average barely change over this horizon, as indicated by the estimated
slope coefficients which are very close to one.
The pooled data in Figure 4 nevertheless mask some interesting variation
over time in the persistence of foreign assets in country portfolios. In Figure 5 we
disaggregate the annual persistence in the top panel of Figure 4 by year.  For each
year indicated on the horizontal axis, we regress the share of foreign assets in wealth
on a constant and its one-year lag, and then plot the resulting slope coefficients on
the vertical axis as a dashed line. The solid line shows a three-year centered moving
average of these estimated slopes. When this slope is greater than (less than) one,
the foreign assets of all countries on average expand (contract).  From the mid-1970s
to the mid-1980s, the slopes are all greater than one. This reflects primarily the rapid
buildup of debt of developing countries financed by borrowing from rich countries and
oil producers, followed by an even greater increase in their recorded debts as many
of these countries suspended payment during the debt crisis of the 1980s. As the
debt crisis was eventually resolved in the late 1980s, the portfolios of all countries
contracted and the slopes fall below one. Somewhat surprisingly, the estimated slope
is near one during the 1990s, providing little evidence of systematic increases in the
share of net foreign assets in country portfolios during this period.
Why is the net foreign asset position as a share of wealth so persistent?  One
immediate possibility is that the persistence of net foreign assets reflects the
persistence of wealth, which we have seen to be an important determinant of the15
cross-country variation in net foreign assets.  We investigate this hypothesis
empirically by regressing the change in net foreign assets on the change in the
logarithm of wealth and the changes in the other control variables considered in Table
3, using the three eight-year changes implied by the four 8-year averaged periods
using in Table 3.  We then perform the same variance decomposition as before to
determine what share of the variation in changes in net foreign assets are due to
changes in wealth. We find that between 40 percent and 70 percent of the variation in
changes in net foreign assets can be attributed to changes in wealth.  This suggests
to us that persistence in wealth is an important source of persistence in foreign
assets.
Fact 4: Gross foreign asset positions are small and consist mostly of foreign loans
rather than foreign equity.
Net foreign assets consist of net claims on foreign equity (e*-e) and net
lending abroad, (l-l*). We illustrate the relative importance of the latter in explaining
the cross-country variation in country portfolios in two ways. Table 4 shows the
composition of foreign assets as they vary across regions, income groups, and time.
Averaging over all years, claims on foreign equity consist of only 0.3 percent of the
wealth of developing countries, while foreign claims on domestic equity account for
2.8 percent of wealth. Among industrial countries
 claims on foreign equity and foreign
claims on domestic equity are only somewhat larger and consist of only 3.3 percent
and 3.9 percent of wealth.
11 In contrast gross borrowing and lending account for 8.8
percent and 4.5 percent of wealth of developing countries, and 11 percent of wealth
each for industrial countries. Finally, it is interesting to note that the share of gross
borrowing and lending in the wealth of industrial countries is much larger than that of
developing countries, especially during the 1990s.
                                               
11 A large literature has documented that the holdings of foreign equity of investors in a few
rich countries are very small (French and Poterba [1991], Tesar and Werner [1992] and
others). Lewis [1999] provides an excellent survey of alternative explanations for this empirical
regularity. Our data confirms that it applies to a much broader set of countries and assets.16
In contrast with Table 4 which focuses on gross positions, Figure 6 provides
evidence on the importance of net lending in explaining the cross-country variation in
net foreign assets.  We plot net lending as a share of wealth on the vertical axis, and
the share of foreign assets in wealth on the horizontal axis, averaging over the period
1966-97.  The top panel shows the results for all countries, while the bottom panel
shows the same information for industrial countries only. Since the slope of this
relationship is nothing more than the covariance between net foreign assets and net
lending divided by the variance of net foreign assets, this slope can be interpreted as
the fraction of the variance in net foreign assets attributable to variation in net lending.
In our full sample of countries this fraction is 82 percent. For the developing countries
in our sample this is not surprising at all, since we have seen that gross equity
positions are small. What is more surprising is that the same number applies to
industrial countries where cross-border claims on equity are much more prevalent
than in developing countries. From this evidence we conclude that most of the cross-
country variation in net foreign assets can be attributed to differences in net lending
rather than in foreign direct and portfolio equity investment.
To sum up, we have seen that the share of net foreign assets in country
portfolios is small and typically negative (Fact 1), exhibits a strong positive
association with wealth in a cross-section of countries (Fact 2), is remarkably
persistent over time (Fact 3), and consists primarily of foreign loans rather than
foreign equity (Fact 4).17
II. Towards an Explanation of Country Portfolios
We next develop a model that emphasizes the interplay of diminishing returns,
production risk and sovereign risk in a world populated by homogeneous mean-
variance investors.
12 Diminishing returns and production risk imply that the risk-
adjusted rate of return to capital declines as more capital is invested in a country. If
these were the only forces at work, we would observe all countries choosing the
same portfolios, and the world distribution of capital stocks would be determined by
the equalization of risk-adjusted rates of return. Sovereign risk however generates a
home bias in the demand for capital. If this were the only force at work, countries
would hold only domestic capital and the world distribution of capital stocks would
mimic the world distribution of wealth. The set of country portfolios and the world
distribution of capital stocks is shaped by the interaction of these forces.
II.1  A Model of International Capital Flows
The world contains two countries, North and South; one factor of production,
capital; and a single good that can be used for consumption and investment. This
good is used as the numeraire. Each country contains a continuum of identical
consumer/investors that evaluate consumption sequences as follows:
(1) 
∞
⋅ δ − ⋅ ⋅
0
t dt e ) t ( c ln E (δ >0)
where c is consumption. The time index will be omitted whenever this is not
confusing. Throughout, we use an asterisk to denote South variables. We assume
North has higher initial wealth than South, i.e. a(0)>a*(0).
                                               
12 The key property of these investors is that the share of each asset in their portfolio does not
depend on their wealth, but only on the menu of available assets. By homogeneous, we mean
that all investors have identical (homothetic) preferences, although possibly different wealth
and menu of available assets.18
The production technology is quite simple. Let k and k* be the capital stocks of
North and South. To produce one unit of capital, one unit of the consumption good is
required. Since capital is reversible, the price of each unit is always one and its return
is the flow of production net of depreciation. Let ω  and ω * be two standard Wiener
processes with independent increments. That is, E[dω ]= E[dω *]=0, E[dω
2]=E[dω *
2]=dt
and  E[dω⋅ dω *]=0. Then the flow of production net of depreciation is given by
π⋅ dt+σ⋅ dω  in North and π *⋅ dt+σ⋅ dω * in South; where π  and π * are short-hand for
π =θ⋅ k
-γ  and π *=θ⋅ k*
-γ  (0≤γ≤ 1; θ >0) and σ  is a positive constant. The parameter γ
measures the strength of diminishing returns which, for simplicity, are treated here as
an externality or congestion effect.
13 The parameter σ  measures the importance of
country-specific production risk. Therefore, this formulation assumes that both
countries have the same technology and embodies the two forces that make the risk-
adjusted rate of return to capital decreasing in the capital stock and create incentives
for capital to move from rich to poor countries.
Domestic investors own the domestic stock of capital and can enter into loan
and equity contracts with foreign investors. International loans promise to pay an
instantaneous interest rate r⋅ dt. At the beginning of the period, the lender gives the
principal to the borrower. At the end of the period there are two possible outcomes.
The borrower might honor its promise, in which case the lender receives the principal
plus interest. The borrower might also default on its promise, in which case the
borrower keeps the principal and interest and the lender receives nothing. A share of
North (South) equity has price v (v*) and promises to pay the net flow of production
generated by one unit of North (South) capital. At the beginning of the period the
buyer gives the value of the equity to the seller. The seller provides the buyer with a
unit of capital and allows him/her to operate the production technology. Once again,
at the end of the period there are two possible outcomes. The seller might honor its
promise, in which case the buyer receives the value of the equity and keeps the net
flow of production. The seller might also default on its promise, in which case the
                                               
13 At the cost of further notation, we could generate this dependence by assuming there is a
production factor that is not priced. Since this is well known, we dispense with the formalities.19
seller keeps the value of the equity and then pays a cost λ  (0≤λ <1) to repossess the
unit of capital and the net flow of production. The buyer receives nothing. Let l be the
amount of lending from North to South and e (e*) be the number of North (South)
shares owned by South (North).
It is evident that international loan and equity contracts will be used in
equilibrium if and only if the probability that they are honored is high enough. This
observation raises a familiar time-inconsistency problem. Since governments cannot
punish foreign citizens, international trade in assets relies on governments’
willingness to punish their own citizens if they default on their obligations towards
foreigners. ‘Ex-ante’ both governments would like to commit to do this and allow
investors to exploit beneficial trade opportunities. However, ‘ex-post’ governments do
not have an incentive to punish default if the benefits exceed the costs. The benefits
of default are clear. But, what are the costs of default? We shall assume they vary
over time. Let s={0,1} be the state of the world. During ‘normal times’ (s=0) both
countries can credibly commit to retaliate with penalties that are large enough to
ensure that default never occurs. During ‘crisis periods’ (s=1) countries cannot
credibly commit to penalties beyond retaliation in kind. As a result, if s=1 South
(North) defaults if its net foreign asset position is negative enough, i.e. v⋅ e-l-v*⋅ e*≤ -
λ⋅ e* (v*⋅ e*+l-v⋅ e≤ -λ⋅ e).
14 Let α⋅ dt and β⋅ dt be the probabilities that the world transitions
from s=0 to s=1 and vice versa; and assume these transitions are independent of
production shocks, E[dω⋅ ds]=E[dω *⋅ ds]=0. The value of ds is revealed after the
beginning-of-period payments of loan and equity contracts have already been made.
What is the equilibrium probability of default? Assume investors believe the
probability of default is zero. If a*>a⋅ (1-λ ), the country portfolios chosen by investors
are consistent with this belief.
15 In this case, the equilibrium probability of default is
                                               
14 The seminal papers on sovereign risk and the ability of various types of penalties to sustain
trade are Eaton and Gersovitz [1981] and Bulow and Rogoff [1989]. Eaton and Fernandez
[1995] and Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996, chapter 6] are two excellent surveys of this topic.
15 If investors believe that the probability of default is zero, the equilibrium of the model implies
v=v*=1, k=k*=(a+a*)/2, e=a*/2, e*=a/2 and l=0. Naturally, no country defaults if s=0. But even
if s=1, North does not default and neither does South if a*>a⋅ (1-λ ).20
zero and sovereign risk is simply not an issue. We shall therefore assume from now
on that a*(0)≤ a(0)⋅ (1-λ ). In this case, the equilibrium probability of default is state-
dependent. Assume the initial state is s=1 and investors believe that default occurs if
the state does not change. Then, investors do not purchase foreign loans and equity
since they expect default to occur with probability close to one, i.e. 1-β⋅ dt. But then
both countries are indifferent on whether to default or not. To ensure that an
equilibrium exists we assume they default (on their non-existent foreign obligations)
so that the beliefs of investors are consistent. This implies that there is no trade in
assets during ‘crisis periods’. Assume next that the initial state is s=0 and investors
believe that default occurs if the state changes. In this case, investors will purchase
foreign loans and equity since default occurs only with a very small probability, i.e.
α⋅ dt. If this probability is not too large, the chosen country portfolios are consistent
with South defaulting in the unlikely event the state of the world changes. Otherwise,
there is no Nash equilibrium in which the country follows a pure strategy.
16 We shall
restrict the analysis to the case in which α  is small. This implies that α⋅ dt is the
equilibrium probability of default in ‘normal times’.
To sum up,  the world economy exhibits periods of trade in assets that
culminate in crises (s transitions from s=0 to s=1) in which the debtor country
defaults. The parameters α   and λ  measure the probability and the destructiveness of
this crisis. After it occurs, a period ensues in which there is no trade in assets.
Eventually, international trade in assets resumes (s transitions from s=1 to s=0) and
the cycle starts again. Although in normal times there might be substantial  trade in
assets, the (small) probability that a crisis occurs has an important effect on the
strategies followed by investors.  We describe these strategies next.
                                               
16 We can construct a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium as follows: Let p be the probability of
default that leads investors to choose country portfolios such that v⋅ e-l-v*⋅ e*=-λ⋅ e*. South is
indifferent between defaulting or not. There is an equilibrium in which South defaults with
probability (p/α )⋅ dt.21
II.2 Investment Strategies
In crisis periods, the only decision that investors face is how much to consume
and save. This limited choice is embedded in this budget constraint which applies
only during crisis periods:
(2) () ω ⋅ ⋅ σ + ⋅ − ⋅ π = d a dt c a da
In normal times there is trade in assets, and we can write the budget
constraint of the representative investor in North as follows:
(3) [] () [] [ ] ds l * e * v e ) v ( * d * e d e k dt c l r * e * ) e k ( da ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ λ − + ω ⋅ + ω ⋅ − ⋅ σ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ π + − ⋅ π =
where, of course, the following restriction applies:
(4) l * e * v e v k a + ⋅ + ⋅ − =
The first two terms of the budget constraint (3) are standard and show how the
expected return and volatility of wealth depends on asset choice, conditional on the
state of the world not changing. The third term describes the wealth shock that the
investor experiences at the onset of a crisis period. Throughout, we rule out Ponzi
schemes and impose short-sale constraints on the holdings of foreign equity. This
last restriction is a logical implication of sovereign risk.
To determine the optimal consumption and portfolio rules, the representative
consumer in North maximizes (1) subject to (2)-(4) and the dynamics of asset prices
and their return characteristics, i.e. the laws of motion of r, v , v*, π , π *, σ  and σ *.
Since the representative consumer is infinitesimal, he/she understands that his/her
actions have no influence on these prices and their evolution. The representative
consumer in the South solves a similar problem. Appendix B shows that the first-order
conditions associated with the investor’s problem can be written as follows:22
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where ρ  is the multiplier associated with constraint (3) divided by the marginal utility of
wealth. This quantity can be interpreted as the risk-free rate that applies on loans
between North residents. A similar set of first-order conditions apply to South.
Equation (5) is the first-order condition associated with c; and shows the
familiar result that consumption equals the annualized value of wealth. Since the rate
of time preference is used as the discount factor, the consumption rule is independent
of the state of the world.
Equations (6) and (7) are the first order conditions associated with k and l; and
describe how investors value production and sovereign risk, respectively. Equation
(6) says that the premium for holding production risk, π -ρ , is the covariance between
the return to one unit of capital and one unit of the investor’s portfolio, σ
2⋅ (k-e)/a.
Equation (7) says that the premium for holding sovereign risk, r-α -ρ , is also
proportional to the covariance between one unit of loans and one unit of the investor’s
portfolio, i.e. 
a
e k a ⋅ λ + −
⋅ α . But since this time the effect of the shock is ‘large’ or
non-local, the factor of proportionality is not one but the ratio of the marginal value of





Equations (8) and (9) are the first-order conditions associated with e and e*;
and describe the supply of North equity and the demand for South equity,
respectively. Equation (8) can be interpreted as determining the price at which North
is willing to sell equity. Each share sold by the North reduces income by one unit of
output, but also provides a gain of 1-λ  in the event of a crisis. This is why equity will
be sold at a discount, i.e. v≤ 1. Using Equations (6) and (7), we find that this discount
is equal to the gain obtained in the event of a crisis times the price of one unit of
income in this state of the world, i.e. 
r
r
) 1 ( v 1
ρ −
⋅ λ − = − . Equation (9) defines the
demand for South equity. This asset contains both production risk and sovereign risk
and the required premium reflects just this.
This completes the description of the model. Equations (4)-(9) and their
counterparts for South jointly determine asset prices (ρ ,ρ *,r,v,v*), the world
distribution of capital stocks (k,k*) and consumptions (c,c*); and the pattern of asset
trade (e,e*,l) as a function of the distribution of wealth (a,a*) and technology
(π ,π *,σ ,σ *). We use this set of equations to derive the cross-sectional implications of
the theory. Then, the budget constraints (2)-(3) determine the law of motion of the
world economy as a function of the initial distribution of wealth and technology and
the realizations of the shocks. We use this additional set of equations to derive the
time-series implications of the theory.
II.3 Three Examples
Before we embark in a quantitative analysis of the model, we discuss three
examples or special cases that help build intuition on the role of the different forces
that the theory emphasizes. In these examples, we assume the world economy starts
in normal times and then ask: What is the initial pattern of trade in assets and how
does it evolve over time?24
EXAMPLE #1: Let α→ 0 so that there is no sovereign risk. In this case, there is
no discount on international assets, i.e. ρ =ρ *=r and v=v*=1. Since countries have
identical and homothetic preferences and, effectively, the same menu of assets, they
choose the same portfolios. As a result, there is no borrowing or lending. Since
technologies are identical, both countries invest 50 percent of their wealth in domestic
capital and the rest in foreign equity. Thus, half of the world capital stock is located in



















If one interprets North and South as the set of industrial and developing





; and net foreign asset positions (as a
percentage of wealth) of North and South are 37.5 and -150 percent, respectively.
The distribution of wealth is constant over time, since both countries choose the same
portfolios and therefore have the same growth rate:
(12) () * d d
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An implication of this is that net foreign asset positions are time invariant.
The predictions of this example are both well-known and dead wrong. The
model exhibits two features that are present in the data: net foreign asset positions
are positively associated with wealth (Fact 2) and very persistent (Fact 3). But the
model also predicts net foreign asset positions that are much larger than those in the
data (Fact 1). It also predicts very large foreign equity positions and no borrowing and
lending, while the data shows that countries hold little foreign equity and finance most
of their net foreign asset positions with foreign loans (Fact 4).25
EXAMPLE #2: Let σ→ 0 so that the only reason why capital flows from rich to
poor countries is to exploit higher rates of return. Now foreign equity and loans deliver
the same return in normal times. If λ =0, foreign equity and loans also deliver the
same return in the event of default and, consequently, the composition of foreign
assets is indeterminate. If λ  is strictly positive, foreign equity becomes a dominated
asset. In this case, countries do not hold foreign equity and finance their net foreign
asset positions with foreign loans. The world distribution of capital stocks and the
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Equations (13) and (14) describe the demand for North and South capital, and
Equation (15) is the market-clearing condition. These equations show that sovereign
risk creates a home bias in the demand for capital. Also, note that the world interest
rate exceeds the marginal product of capital in both countries. This difference is the
risk premium required to compensate lenders for sovereign risk. The top panel of
Table 5 computes the foreign asset position of North under alternative assumptions
for γ  and α  (Remember the net foreign asset position of South is –4 times that of
North). Net foreign asset positions for North and South range from zero (as α→∞ ) to
37.5 and –150 percent (as α→ 0).  What are reasonable values for α  and γ ? For
instance, α =0.02 is consistent with the 20
th century experience which features two
episodes of large-scale defaults in the 1930s and the 1980s. Since the expected
value of aggregate production is θ⋅ k
1-γ , values of γ  around 0.6 correspond to the
neoclassical growth model, while values of γ  near one are close to the linear growth
model. Table 5 shows that if α =0.02 and γ =0.6, the net foreign asset positions of
North and South are 20.3 and –81.2 percent. These numbers are roughly half of
those we found in the previous example. If γ =0.1, the net foreign asset positions are26
5.4 and –21.6 percent. These numbers are now seven times smaller than in the
previous example and start to resemble those we find in the data.
A nice feature of the first example was the prediction of constant net foreign
asset positions. Since countries chose the same portfolios, they had the same growth
rate and the world distribution of wealth was constant. Interestingly, this turns out to
be the case also in this second example, albeit for different reasons:
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Countries choose quite different portfolios. North invests part of its wealth in
North capital and lends the rest to South. South invests more than its wealth in South
capital and borrows the difference from North. Since there is less South capital, South
obtains a higher return on its domestic capital than North does. But since the interest
rate on foreign loans exceeds the marginal product of capital of South, North obtains
an even higher return on its foreign loans during normal times. These effects balance
and both countries share the same growth rate. An implication is that net foreign
asset positions are constant over time.
This example shares with the first one the predictions that net foreign asset
positions are positively associated with wealth and very persistent. But this is all that
they have in common. Although the predicted net foreign asset positions are still a bit
large relative to those in the data, the gap between theory and data has narrowed
substantially. Moreover, if we are willing to assume that λ  is positive (although
arbitrarily small) the model also predicts that foreign equity holdings are zero and net
foreign asset positions are financed through foreign loans. It seems therefore that this
second example is a major improvement over the previous one, and a small dose of
sovereign risk moves us a long way towards reconciling theory and data. But this
example is a bit misleading since it suggests that λ  plays a small role in the analysis.
To counteract this impression, we explain what happens when we leave λ  out of the
theory.27
EXAMPLE #3: Let λ→ 0 so that there are no costs of transferring ownership of























This equations state that countries receive a fraction of each of the outputs
that is equal to their share of world wealth. The intuition for this result is simple: Since
the exposure to sovereign risk is the net foreign asset position, countries hedge
against this type of risk by holding small net foreign asset positions. This does not
preclude them from hedging against production risk by holding large gross foreign
equity positions that are roughly balanced. In fact, it is possible to show that there is
no borrowing and lending if λ =0. Does this mean that we are back to the predictions
of the first example? Not quite. A major departure from the first example is that
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Once again, Equations (18) and (19) describe the demand for North and
South capital, and Equation (20) is the market-clearing condition. Now the world
interest rate need not exceed the expected marginal product of capital. Although
foreign loans still command a premium to compensate for sovereign risk, domestic
capital also commands a premium to compensate for production risk. The middle
panel of Table 5 show the predicted net foreign asset positions when σ  is 0.05. We
choose this number because it is the average standard deviation of the growth rate in28
a sample of 88 countries from 1960 to 1994. Since production risk creates an
additional incentive for capital to flow from North to South, the net foreign asset
positions are larger here than in the second example, but only slightly so.
A second difference with the first example is that full sharing of production risk
is now consistent with a measured home bias in country portfolios. Sovereign risk
creates a discount on foreign equity, that is, v<1 and v*<1. This means that full
sharing of production risk does not require countries to invest a fraction of their wealth
in foreign equity that is proportional to the share of foreign capital in the world capital
stock. For instance, assume that 25 percent of the world capital is located in South. If
discounts were zero, v=v*=1, full sharing of production risk implies that both countries
invest 25 percent of their wealth in South capital and the rest in North capital. If
discounts are 50 percent, v=v*=0.50, full sharing of production risk implies that South
invests 52.5 percent of its wealth in South capital, while North invests only 12.5
percent. This is enough for North to buy the rights to 75 percent of South’s output. If
the discounts are large enough, the model might be consistent with the observation
that foreign equity holdings are small. Table 6 shows these discounts when σ =0.05.
The discount on South equity ranges from 20 to 30 percent. The discount on North
equity (not shown in Table 6) is a little bit larger. Nevertheless, these discounts are
not large enough to reconcile theory with data.
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This result, which follows from the fact that there is complete sharing of
production risk, implies that net foreign asset positions do not change over time.29
As in the previous two examples we have the prediction that net foreign asset
positions are positively associated with wealth and very persistent. As in the second
example, predicted net foreign asset positions are small enough to resemble those
we observe in the data. But this example departs dramatically from the previous one
in its predictions regarding the composition of net foreign assets. As in the first
example, we have now large foreign equity positions and no borrowing and lending.
This difference between the second and third example illustrates how the composition
of foreign assets is determined in the theory. During normal times, equity is a better
asset to transfer capital from North to South since it allows countries to share
production risk. But in the event of default, equity is a worse asset since it generates
losses. If α⋅λ  is large relative to σ
2, investors hold little equity and instead use loans to
finance net foreign asset positions. This is what happens in the second example
where σ→ 0. If α⋅λ  is small relative to σ
2, investors hold large equity positions and do
not use foreign loans. This is what happens in the third example where λ→ 0.
This is as far as we go with examples. We next turn to the full-fledged model.
II.4 Quantitative Implications
Can the model developed here replicate the main features of the data with a
reasonable set of parameter values? The key issue is to agree on what constitutes a
‘reasonable’ set of parameters values. We propose the following benchmark values:
γ =0.2, σ =0.05, α =0.02 and λ =0.20. A choice of γ =0.2 means that we settle
somewhere in between the neoclassical and the linear growth models. We set σ =0.05
because this is the average standard deviation of the growth rate in a sample of 88
countries from 1960 to 1994.
17 We also choose α =0.02 because the 20
th century has
experienced two episodes of large-scale defaults by developing countries in the
1930s and the 1980s. Admittedly, we have little intuition as to what a reasonable30
value for λ  is. We therefore chose λ =0.20, which is a value that delivers relatively
good results. Since there is substantial uncertainty regarding the values of all the
parameters, we also show how the results vary with each of the them. Throughout,
we assume that the share of world wealth in North is 0.8, which is consistent with the
interpretation of North as the set of industrialized countries in Table 1.
Our base case predicts net foreign asset positions for the North and South of
10.5 percent and -42 percent, respectively. This means that 71.5 percent of the world
capital is located in North and 28.5 percent in South. Therefore, only 8.5 percent of
the world capital stock flows from North to South. The North portfolio contains 89.5
percent of North capital, and 6.25 and 4.25 percent of foreign loans and equity,
respectively. North does not sell equity to South. The South portfolio contains 142
percent of South capital. This is financed by selling foreign loans and equity worth 25
and 17 percent of South’s wealth, respectively. Overall, this base case predicts too
much trade in assets relative to the data (See Figure 1 and Table 4). But these
numbers show that substantial progress has been made by including a very modest
dose of sovereign risk in the theory. This becomes apparent if we compare this base
case to the standard model without sovereign risk (See Example 1). The latter
predicts net foreign asset positions of 37.5 and 150 percent in North and South. This
implies that half of the capital would be located in each country and 30 percent of the
world capital stock would flow from North to South. Moreover, the country portfolios
are predicted to be identical and contain 50 percent of domestic capital and 50
percent of foreign equity.
The next step, of course, is to determine how sensitive are these predictions
to the particular choice of parameter values. Figure 7 shows how the predictions of
the model vary with the two parameters that describe sovereign risk. In each panel of
the Figure we change one of the parameters holding constant the rest at their
benchmark values. Not surprisingly, increasing the probability of crises (α ) and/or the
                                                                                                                                      
17 In this same sample, the average growth rate was 0.02. We set the rate of time preference
at δ =0.02 and choose a value for θ =0.04 so as to match this average growth rate given a
choice of units such that a+a*=1.31
destruction these generate (λ ) leads to a reduction in net foreign asset positions.
Halving the probability of crises from twice to once a century almost doubles the
predicted net foreign asset positions (from 10.5 and –44 to 18.75 and –75 percent).
Doubling the probability of crises from twice century to four times a century almost
halves the predicted net foreign asset positions (from 10.5 and –44 to 5.75 and –23
percent). It seems therefore, that predicted net foreign asset positions are quite
sensitive to changes in α . This is what we found also when we moved from the first
example to the second and third ones. Figure 7 shows that this predicted net foreign
asset positions are not very sensitive to changes in λ . We also found this to be the
case when we moved from the second to the third example.
Figure 7 also shows how the base case predictions for the South portfolio vary
with α  and λ  (the implications for the North portfolio follow immediately). Increases in
both α  and λ  make equity less attractive relative to loans. In the base case, these
variables are already high enough to close the North foreign equity market, but not
large enough to close the South foreign equity market. Moderate increases in α  and λ
are sufficient to close the South foreign equity market. While moderate reductions in
α  and λ  would open the North equity market, it would take large reductions in these
parameters to raise foreign equity holdings substantially. It seems that the predictions
for the composition of foreign assets in our base case are not very sensitive to small
changes in α  and λ . On the other hand, we have also a lot of uncertainty regarding
the value of λ . If this value were close to zero, the predictions regarding the
composition of foreign assets would change substantially, as shown in the second
example above.
Figure 8 shows how the predictions of the model vary with the parameters that
describe technology. Simple inspection of this Figure reveals that predicted net
foreign asset positions are quite sensitive to our assumptions about diminishing
returns (γ ), but not very sensitive to our assumptions on production risk (σ ). For
example, if we raise γ  from 0.2 to 0.6, the net foreign asset positions basically double
(from 10.5 and –44 to 20.5 and –82 percent). As γ  goes to zero, net foreign asset32
positions collapse to zero as well. This reflects the fact that there are no longer any
return differentials to provide incentives for capital flows and, for our choice of
parameters, the risk of default is sufficiently high to outweigh any benefits of
diversifying production risk. If α⋅λ≥σ
2 (which is a restriction satisfied by the benchmark
values), it is necessary to assume that γ >0 to generate capital flows. The observation
that changes in σ  have small effects on net foreign asset positions was already made
when we moved from the second to the third example. Not surprisingly, the relative
importance of γ  and σ  for the composition of country portfolios is just the opposite.
Increases in production risk raise the diversification benefits of holding foreign equity
and induce investors to use more of it and less loans. We see that as σ  increases first
the North begins to purchase South equity and eventually the South also holds North
equity. In the process, holdings of foreign loans decline.
An important feature of the data is the persistence of net foreign asset
positions. This requires that relative wealth positions do not change much over time.
Figure 9 confirms this is likely to be the case, since the expected values for the
growth rate of wealth are quite similar across countries. In our base case, South’s
average growth rate is slightly higher than North’s (2.7 vs. 2.5 percent per year);and
the same is true for the standard deviation of this growth rate (6 vs. 4.7 percent per
year). Over the 30-year horizon covered by our dataset this difference in average
growth rates would lead to a cumulative increase in the relative wealth of the South of
only 6%. This finding of an almost constant world distribution of wealth is not very
sensitive to changes in the parameters. We had already encountered this result in
each of the three examples discussed above.
To sum up, if diminishing returns at the country level are weak, a small doses
of sovereign risk can move us a long way towards reconciling the theory’s predicted
capital flows with those we observe in the data. Both indicate that net foreign asset
positions are small (Fact 1), positively associated with wealth (Fact 2), and very
persistent (Fact 3). If diminishing returns at the country level are strong, the theory
predicts net foreign asset positions that are too large relative to those in the data. A33
natural way to reduce them would be to assume that North has a better technology.
In any case, the key parameters regulating the size of capital flows are the probability
of crises and the strength of diminishing returns. With respect to the composition of
portfolios, we find that the theory can replicate the data only if equity is a bad asset to
have in the event of crises and/or production risk is not very important. Only then
does the  theory predict that foreign equity holdings are small and most of the net
foreign asset position is financed with loans (Fact 3).34
Appendix A: Data Sources
In this appendix we describe the data and methodology used to construct
estimates of country portfolios. To do this, we require data on the domestic capital
stock, foreign claims on the domestic capital stock, the stock of domestic residents’
holdings of capital located abroad, and domestic residents lending to and borrowing
from abroad.
Data on stocks of some of these assets are available for some countries and
for some years in a variety of sources. This existing stock data suffers from two
deficiencies. First, the coverage is limited to rich countries and to recent years.
Second, estimates of stocks of assets are constructed using methodologies which are
often poorly documented and may vary considerably across countries, assets, and
time.  In contrast, data on flows of investment in these assets exist for a much larger
set of countries, years, and assets.  The flow of investment in the domestic capital
stock is readily available from national accounts data, and a consistent treatment of
flows on international assets is available in the balance of payments statistics
reported in the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics
Yearbook, Revisions 4 and 5 (BOPSY4 and BOPSY5).  In order to expand country
coverage and ensure a consistent methodology across assets and countries, we build
up estimates of stocks of assets based primarily on this available flow data, some
existing estimates of stocks, and the standard accounting identity that:
(A1)   ct 1 t , c ct ct F S V S + ⋅ = −
where Sct is the value of the stock of a given asset in country c at the end of period t
in constant 1990 US dollars, Fct is the flow of new investment in that asset, also in
constant 1990 US dollars, and Vct is the gross change between periods t-1 and t in
the value of the stock of that asset in period t-1.35
In order to implement this approach for each asset, we require an estimate of
its stock in some initial period, data on the corresponding flow of investment, and
information on changes in the value of the asset.  The remainder of this appendix
describes how we do this for each asset of interest.
Domestic Capital
Flows:  We use data on gross domestic investment in constant 1990 dollars at
PPP from the Summers and Heston Penn World Table Version 5.6
(IxRGDPCHxPOP).
18  This covers non-residential and residential building, machinery
and equipment, and changes in inventories.  We depart from the usual practice of
cumulating only gross domestic fixed investment (which excludes inventory
accumulation) since inventories themselves form a (small) component of wealth.
Initial Stocks:  Summers and Heston report estimates of capital stocks for 61
countries starting in 1965 (KAPWx(1+KRES/100)xRGDPCHxPOP/RGDPW).  We
start by estimating a cross-country regression of the capital/GDP ratio on the log-level
of real GDP per capita.  We then use the fitted values of this regression to estimate
the initial capital stock for all of the countries in our sample, in the first year for which
data on per capita GDP and investment are available.  Since the correlation between
capital output ratios and GDP per capita is very large, this procedure by construction
delivers initial capital stocks that are very similar to the Summers-Heston estimates.
Since many of the countries in our final sample have data on investment beginning in
the 1950s, unavoidable measurement errors in initial stocks will have minimal impact
on our estimated stocks after 1966 when our data on foreign assets begins.
                                               
18 We work with an expanded version of the Penn World Tables which extends the coverage
of real per capita GDP, investment, and population by using growth rates of local-currency
constant price GDP and investment, as well as population, as reported in the World Bank
World Tables.36
Valuation.  In principle we would like the capital stock, and all other assets, to
be measured at market value. An obvious choice would be to proxy changes in the
value of capital by changes in a share price index.  This may be inappropriate for
several reasons.  Capital listed on the stock market, especially in developing
countries, is not representative of the stock of capital as a whole.  The link between
changes in share prices and the underlying value of firms is tenuous, especially in
developing countries where markets are thin.  We instead consider replacement cost,
and proxy changes in this by the change in the local currency investment deflator.
Finally, we need to take into account physical depreciation.  This of course varies
across assets, and probably also across countries (consider the adverse effects of
poor infrastructure).  In the absence of better information we are forced to rely on the
average value of 6 percent used by Summers and Heston.
In summary, we measure the gross change in value of the domestic capital
stock during period t as:
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where δ =0.06 is the depreciation rate, Pt is the US price level, ect is the exchange rate
in local currency units per US dollar, and 
I
ct P  is the investment deflator in country c at
time t.  A small concern is with the timing of these prices.  Since we are measuring
end-of-period stocks we would like to use corresponding end-of-period prices and
exchange rates. Unfortunately gross domestic investment deflators are reported as
mid-year averages for most countries, so that some mismatch in timing is
unavoidable.  Finally, for some countries with very high inflation, we find extremely
large revaluations of the domestic capital stock that probably only reflect errors in the
timing of exchange rate and price data.  Rather than censor these from our dataset,
we leave them in but discard them when appropriate in empirical work.37
Cross-Border Claims on Equity
In order to isolate the portion of the domestic capital stock owned by domestic
residents, we need to subtract foreign claims on this asset. Similarly, we need to
measure domestic residents’ claims on capital located abroad. These claims can take
the form of direct investment or portfolio equity investment, although the dividing line
between the two is vague.  For example, many countries consider a 10 percent
ownership stake to constitue direct investment, but this threshold varies for others.  In
this paper, we do not distinguish between majority and minority ownership  as the
distinction is irrelevant for our purposes.  However, we construct data on the two
stocks separately for use in other applications.
Flows:  We rely on flows of inward and outward direct and portfolio equity
investment as reported in the BOPSY5 (lines 4505, 4555, 4610 and 4660).  Data on
these items are also available under the Revision 4 presentation of the Balance of
Payments Statistics Yearbook (BOPSY4).  Although there are minor changes in
definitions between the BOPSY4 and BOPSY5, in practice, the correspondence
between the BOPSY5 and BOPSY4 is almost perfect for these items for most
countries,  We therefore extend the coverage of the BOPSY5 backwards using
BOPSY4 data wherever possible.
Initial Stocks:  The BOPSY5 reports data on the stocks corresponding to flows
of direct and equity investment for most industrial economies (lines 8505, 8555, 8610
and 8660), and for some countries these stocks can be extended backwards using
data from the BOPSY4.  For most countries where these stocks are available, we use
the first available stock reported in the BOPSY4 and BOPSY5, and then use Equation
(A1) and the data on valuation changes discussed below to construct stocks for all
years for which flow data are available before and after this date.  Note that since
stocks of direct investments are provided in the BOPS  as reported by country
sources, they are quite similar to those reported in other publications such as the
OECD and UNCTAD, which rely on the same national sources.38
For most developing countries, estimates of the stock of inward direct
investment originating in OECD economies is available in OECD (1970) for 1967.  We
use this to measure initial stocks of direct investment in these countries.  We are not
aware of any comprehensive source of data on stocks of portfolio equity investment
in or originating in developing countries, other than the BOPSY5 where coverage of
this variable is very poor.
For countries for which no stock information is available in any of these
sources, we infer initial stocks as the ratio of the flow of investment in that asset
relative to gross domestic investment, multiplied by the domestic capital stock
obtained above. In order to smooth out year-to-year deviations from the equality
between marginal and average portfolios, we use the average investment ratio in the
first three years for which flow data is available to implement this approach.  In most
cases for portfolio equity investment, the observed initial flows are zero, and so this
results in an estimate of a zero initial stock, which is probably correct.
Valuation.  We proceed from the assumption that changes in the value of
capital located in a country do not vary systematically with the ownership of this
capital.  For inward direct and portfolio equity investment, we therefore use the same
valuation method as for the domestic capital stock, as summarized in Equation (A2).
Applying this same principle for valuing outward direct and portfolio equity investment
is more difficult since for each country we need to know the destination by recipient
country of their investment abroad.  For direct investment by OECD economies, we
have this type of information starting in the mid-1980s as reported by the OECD.  We
use the distribution of the stock of direct investment across recipient countries to
construct a weighted average of the changes in value of capital located in each
recipient country:
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where  t , ' c , c w  is the share of foreign direct investment by country c located in country
c’.   We use this weighted average to measure changes in the value of outward direct
investment for the 13 countries for which data on FDI by destination are available in
1990.  For the remaining countries in our sample, we assume that the distribution of
FDI across destination countries is similar to that of OECD economies.  We therefore
measure Vct for these countries as a simple average of the Vcts for the 13 countries
for which we have the data required to implement Equation (A3).
For portfolio equity investment, we do not have comparable data on its
distribution across recipient countries by source country.  We therefore assume that
its distribution across countries is sufficiently similar to that of direct investment that it
is possible to use the same valuation adjustment as we do for direct investment.
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Cross-Border Borrowing and Lending
Flows:  We rely on inward and outward non-equity flows as reported in the
BOPSY5 (lines 4619+4703, and 4669+4753).  This includes all debt securities, trade
credits and other loans. Data on these items are also available in the BOPSY4.  As
with equity, there are some changes in definition between the BOPSYY5 and
BOPSYY4, which in practice turn out to be minor for most of the countries in our
sample, and so we extend the coverage of the BOPSY5 backwards using BOPSY4
data wherever possible.
Initial Stocks:  Stock data corresponding to these flows are available from a
variety of sources.  For developing countries, the most comprehensive available data
                                               
19 It is worth noting a small caveat here.  Data on flows of direct investment include reinvested
earnings of foreign-owned firms, while data on flows of portfolio equity investment do not.  In
principle changes in the stock market valuation of equities will reflect these reinvested
earnings, while changes in the replacement cost of capital do not.  To the extent these
reinvested earnings are important, our procedure will understate the stock of portfolio equity
claims.  However, the alternative of using stock market data to value equity is even less
attractive, given the weaknesses of stock market data noted above.40
on stocks of debt is the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) report,
which provides data since 1970 (line DT.DOD.DECT.CD).  For most industrial
countries, data on stocks of borrowing and lending are reported in the BOPSY5 and
BOPSY4.  The only source of data that we are aware of for lending by developing
countries is the BOPSY5 and BOPSY4, where coverage is very weak.  Finally, for
those countries where we have no information at all on stocks of borrowing and
lending, we infer stocks from flows as described above for equity.
Valuation:  Changes in the dollar value of outstanding debt net of amortization
can occur for three reasons.  The value of the currencies in which the debt is
denominated may change relative to the US dollar.  Depending on the structure of
debt and the term structure of interest rates, the value of debt will change over time.
Finally, the value of debt may change with changes in the perceived probability of
repayment.  In principle each of these will be reflected in changes in the secondary
market price of debt.  Unfortunately, secondary markets are thin and recent,
especially for developing country debt, which makes comprehensive valuation
adjustments difficult.  We therefore adopt a more limited strategy.  For developing
country debts, we rely on the full time series of stocks reported by the GDF, as these
include adjustments for changes in the value of denominating currencies.  For
developing country lending, and for the borrowing and lending of industrial countries,
we do not have data even on the currency composition of these assets, let alone their
maturity structure.  We therefore can do no more than assume that the nominal value







where Pt is the US consumer price index.  It is interesting to note that for industrial
countries with high-quality stock data on borrowing and lending, this simple method
yields very similar estimates.41
Other Items
The stocks of cross-border assets described above cover the majority of items
in countries’ international investment positions.  For completeness, we also measure
the reserves of the monetary authority, distinguishing between gold and non-gold
reserves.  Stocks of gold are a component of wealth that does not constitute a claim
on foreigners.  For the purposes of this paper, we therefore include it with the
domestic capital stock.  We measure the stock of gold in millions of fine troy ounces
as reported in the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) (line 1ad) multiplied by the dollar price of gold.  For most countries, short-term
dollar-denominated debt instruments are an important component  of non-gold
reserves. For the purposes of this paper we therefore count non-gold reserves as a
part of lending abroad.  We measure the stock of non-gold reserves directly as
reported in the IFS (line 1ld).
Data and Results
We implement these ideas using data described above.  We restrict attention
to the sample of 98 countries with population greater than 1 million and per capita
GDP in 1990 greater than 1000 1990 US dollars at PPP.  We then discard countries
with fewer than five years of data on balance of payments items, and those for which
there are substantial anomalies in the reported balance of payments statistics that we
were unable to resolve with reference to country sources.  By far the most
problematic source of data is the BOPSY5 and BOPSY4.  The electronic versions of
these sources often report zero stocks when there are positive flows of assets.  In the
BOPSY4 the data occasionally contain outright errors which needed to be eliminated
by inspecting the data for each variable, country and year. Since data coverage is
weak and the prevalence of these types of difficulties increases sharply prior to 1966,
we begin our sample in this year. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 73
countries covering an average of 25 years per country over the period 1966-1997.42
Finally, occasionally our procedures described above result in estimates of
stocks of assets that are negative in some years, most commonly as a result of
extrapolating flows backwards from a stock estimate in later years.  In the vast
majority of cases these negative stocks are very small, less than 0.5 percent of GDP
in absolute value. If the minimum observation in a given stock series is negative but
no smaller than -0.5 percent of GDP, we shift up the series to eliminate these.  The
handful of remaining negative stocks are discarded.
The data are available at www.worldbank.org/research/growth.43
Appendix B: Solution Details
In this appendix, we solve the representative consumer’s problem and show
that Equations (5)-(9) describe his/her optimal consumption and portfolio rules. The
investment opportunity set that the consumer faces is fully described by the vector
X=(v,v*,r,π ,π *,σ ,σ *). We shall denote the i
th element of this vector as xi. Let the
dynamics of this element be given as follows:
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(A1) ds * d d dt dx i
*
i i i i ⋅ ξ + ω ⋅ ψ + ω ⋅ ψ + ⋅ µ =
In equilibrium, µ i, ψ i, ψ i*, and ξ i might be functions of aggregate variables, but
the representative consumer is infinitesimal and does not take into consideration how
his/her choices affect these aggregates. Let V
0 and V
1 be the value functions of the
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Also, we have that:
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is the multiplier of the constraint a=k-v⋅ e+v*⋅ e*+l; and η 1 η 2 and η 3 are
the multipliers associated with the constraints that k≥ e, e≥ 0 and e*≥ 0, respectively.
The usual Kuhn-Tucker complementary-slack conditions apply: η 1⋅ (k-e)=0, η 2⋅ e=0 and
η 3⋅ e*=0. It is straightforward to verify that  ) x ( f a ln
1
V i
0 0 + ⋅
δ
=  and  ) x ( f a ln
1
V i
1 1 + ⋅
δ
=
solve the Bellman equations (A2) and (A4). Using these value functions and the first-
order conditions, it follows that (A5)-(A9) correspond to Equations (5)-(9) in the text.45
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Table 1:  Sample of Countries
I. Industrialized Countries II. Developing Countries
a. East Asia and the Pacific c. Middle East and North Africa
Australia AUS China CHN Algeria DZA
Austria AUT Indonesia IDN Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
Belgium-Luxembourg BLX Korea, Rep. KOR Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN
Canada CAN Malaysia MYS Israel ISR
Switzerland CHE Philippines PHL Jordan JOR
Germany DEU Singapore SGP Morocco MAR
Denmark DNK Thailand THA Oman OMN
Spain ESP Saudi Arabia SAU
Finland FIN b. Latin American and the Caribbean Syrian Arab Republic SYR
France FRA Tunisia TUN
United Kingdom GBR Argentina ARG Turkey TUR
Greece GRC Bolivia BOL
Ireland IRL Brazil BRA d. South Asia
Italy ITA Chile CHL
Japan JPN Colombia COL Bangladesh BGD
Netherlands NLD Costa Rica CRI India IND
Norway NOR Dominican Republic DOM Sri Lanka LKA
New Zealand NZL Ecuador ECU Pakistan PAK
Portugal PRT Guatemala GTM
Sweden SWE Honduras HND e. Sub-Saharan Africa
United States USA Jamaica JAM
Mexico MEX Côte d'Ivoire CIV
Nicaragua NIC Cameroon CMR
Peru PER Congo COG
El Salvador SLV Lesotho LSO
Trinidad and Tobago TTO Mauritius MUS
Uruguay URY Senegal SEN
Venezuela VEN South Africa ZAF48
Table 2:  Net Foreign Assets Are Small
(Share of net foreign assets in country portfolios, f/a)
66-73 74-81 82-89 90-97 66-97
Weighted Average
Industrial Countries 0.013 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.004
Developing Countries -0.099 -0.037 -0.081 -0.065 -0.068
  EAP -0.090 -0.036 -0.051 -0.036 -0.037
  LAC -0.095 -0.102 -0.150 -0.101 -0.112
  MENA -0.169 0.133 -0.034 -0.121 -0.068
  SA -0.054 -0.043 -0.054 -0.063 -0.054
  SSA -0.195 -0.138 -0.118 -0.069 -0.137
Median
Industrial Countries -0.011 -0.028 -0.025 -0.037 -0.016
Developing Countries -0.120 -0.116 -0.167 -0.139 -0.137
  EAP -0.098 -0.113 -0.117 -0.080 -0.093
  LAC -0.116 -0.122 -0.215 -0.150 -0.153
  MENA -0.108 -0.072 -0.164 -0.165 -0.171
  SA -0.086 -0.102 -0.115 -0.095 -0.085
  SSA -0.202 -0.185 -0.112 -0.035 -0.206
Notes:  Weighted averages are computed over an unbalanced panel 8-year
averages for 68 countries.  As a result, changes across periods to a small extent
reflect changes in the composition of the sample.  Results using a smaller
balanced panel are similar.49
Table 3:  Net Foreign Assets Increase with Wealth
66-97 66-73 74-81 82-89 90-97
Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err.
No Controls, Coefficient on ln(Wealth Per Capita)
Constant Only 0.058 0.013 0.037 0.010 0.061 0.018 0.080 0.021 0.062 0.015
Regional Dummies 0.058 0.021 0.013 0.019 0.075 0.035 0.105 0.036 0.074 0.026
Regional Dummies, 0.038 0.017 0.015 0.020 0.032 0.017 0.070 0.033 0.066 0.020
Balanced Panel
# Observations 66 56 65 65 56
# Observations, Balanced 46 46 46 46 46
With Controls and Regional Dummies
Intercept -1.165 0.251 -0.357 0.516 -1.343 0.406 -1.700 0.310 -1.419 0.306
ln(Wealth Per Capita) 0.069 0.017 0.016 0.027 0.060 0.027 0.126 0.034 0.116 0.022
Years Secondary Schooling -0.048 0.030 0.060 0.044 0.001 0.023 -0.066 0.031 -0.045 0.022
(Exports + Imports)/GDP 0.027 0.037 0.028 0.168 0.098 0.090 -0.018 0.049 0.038 0.036
M2/GDP 0.336 0.155 0.025 0.166 0.175 0.100 0.280 0.152 0.155 0.100
Gov't Consumption/GDP -0.331 0.203 0.080 0.355 -0.046 0.285 -0.584 0.324 -0.873 0.268
Civil Liberties -0.009 0.014 -0.029 0.021 -0.011 0.011 -0.013 0.016 -0.015 0.016
ln(Population) 0.026 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.038 0.013 0.031 0.014 0.026 0.014
Std.Dev. Growth 0.690 0.731 0.541 1.430 0.294 0.948 0.668 0.830 -1.164 1.034
# Observations 63 53 62 62 51
R-Squared 0.586 0.357 0.43 0.551 0.718
Share of Variance in Fitted Values Explained by ln(Wealth Per Capita)
0.589 0.136 0.612 0.761 0.88850
Table 4:  Foreign Assets Consist Primarily of Borrowing and Lending
66-73 74-81 82-89 90-97 66-97
Weighted Average
Industrial Countries
  Net Foreign Assets 0.013 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.004
  Equity Owned by Foreigners 0.025 0.024 0.029 0.042 0.033
  Equity Held Abroad 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.053 0.039
  Gross Lending 0.041 0.061 0.124 0.158 0.112
  Gross Borrowing 0.031 0.059 0.127 0.175 0.114
Developing Countries
  Net Foreign Assets -0.099 -0.037 -0.081 -0.065 -0.068
  Equity Owned by Foreigners 0.039 0.022 0.023 0.029 0.028
  Equity Held Abroad 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003
  Gross Lending 0.024 0.060 0.048 0.041 0.045
  Gross Borrowing 0.088 0.077 0.108 0.082 0.088
Median
Industrial Countries
  Net Foreign Assets -0.011 -0.028 -0.025 -0.037 -0.016
  Equity Owned by Foreigners 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.061 0.035
  Equity Held Abroad 0.007 0.007 0.023 0.053 0.028
  Gross Lending 0.046 0.050 0.119 0.140 0.105
  Gross Borrowing 0.044 0.083 0.161 0.199 0.145
Developing Countries
  Net Foreign Assets -0.120 -0.116 -0.167 -0.139 -0.137
  Equity Owned by Foreigners 0.039 0.027 0.031 0.033 0.035
  Equity Held Abroad 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
  Gross Lending 0.028 0.043 0.045 0.056 0.051
  Gross Borrowing 0.105 0.128 0.174 0.155 0.160
Notes:  Weighted averages are computed over an unbalanced panel of 8-year
averages for 68 countries.  As a result, changes across periods to a small extent
reflect changes in the composition of the sample.  Results using a smaller balanced
panel are similar.51
Table 5:  Examples 2 and 3
Foreign Assets / Wealth in the North
Sigma=0.00
Alpha
Gamma 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.00 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.10 0.375 0.098 0.054 0.037 0.028 0.023
0.20 0.375 0.161 0.099 0.071 0.055 0.045
0.40 0.375 0.229 0.163 0.126 0.102 0.086
0.60 0.375 0.264 0.203 0.165 0.138 0.119
Sigma=0.05
Alpha
Gamma 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.00 0.375 0.030 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.006
0.10 0.375 0.119 0.067 0.046 0.035 0.028
0.20 0.375 0.175 0.110 0.079 0.062 0.050
0.40 0.375 0.236 0.170 0.132 0.107 0.090
0.60 0.375 0.268 0.208 0.169 0.142 0.122




-1. We also set world wealth equal to one, that is, a+a*=1.52
Table 6:  Example 3
Discount on South Equity (v*)
Alpha
Gamma 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.00 1.000 0.815 0.677 0.578 0.504 0.447
0.10 1.000 0.860 0.730 0.630 0.553 0.492
0.20 1.000 0.879 0.763 0.667 0.591 0.529
0.40 1.000 0.894 0.797 0.713 0.643 0.585
0.60 1.000 0.901 0.814 0.739 0.675 0.621
Foreign Investment in South (e*v*/a*)
Alpha
Gamma 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.00 1.500 0.728 0.570 0.476 0.409 0.359
0.10 1.500 1.014 0.737 0.592 0.498 0.431
0.20 1.500 1.193 0.875 0.698 0.583 0.502
0.40 1.500 1.389 1.067 0.867 0.729 0.629
0.60 1.500 1.492 1.189 0.987 0.842 0.734




-1.  We also set world wealth equal to one, that is, a+a*=1.53





















Notes:  This figure plots the frequency distribution of the share of net foreign assets in
wealth, pooling all country-year observations in an unbalanced panel spanning 68
countries over the period 1966-1997.54































































































Notes: Switzerland (a=$110000, k = $90000) is not shown to scale.55





































































































Notes:  Congo (ln(a)=7.22,f/a -1.55) and Egypt (ln(a)=7.2, f/a-0.98) are influential and are
excluded.  Including these two observations gives a slope of 0.09 with a standard error of
0.01.56
Figure 4: The Share of Net Foreign Assets In Country Portfolios Is Persistent
























































































































Notes:  This graph plots the share of foreign assets in wealth against its one-year (five-year)
(10-year) lag in the first (second) (third) panels, pooling all country-year observations in an
unbalanced panel spanning 68 countries over 1966-97.57









1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Notes: This graph plots the slope coefficient of a cross-sectional regression of the share of
foreign assets in wealth on itself lagged one year, for the year indicated on the horizontal
axis.  The heavy line is a three-year centered moving average of these slope coefficients.58
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